Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function by Gershman, Bennett L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 5 Article 6
5-2011
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in
the Charging Function
Bennett L. Gershman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 Hastings L.J. 1259 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol62/iss5/6
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in
the Charging Function
BENNETr L. GERSHMAN*
A prosecutor's charging decision is the heart of the prosecution function. The charging
decision involves an extraordinary exercise of discretionary power that is unreviewable.
As a result, the decision is difficult to guide except in the broadest terms. The proposed
revisions to the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function
attempt to address several key issues that inform the charging decision, by broadening
the language of several provisions of the current Standards as well as adding several
new provisions. To be sure, the proposed Standards significantly change the current
Standards with respect to the proper factors and considerations affecting a prosecutor's
charging decision. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether these Standards purport to
establish ethical guidelines for prosecution, or merely guidelines for a prosecutor's
exercise of judgment and policy in the charging function. This Article assesses the
extent to which the proposed Standards cover several charging issues effectively,
inadequately, or at all. Specifically, this Article focuses on (i) the retention and
modification of the probable cause standard for filing charges; (2) the differing
Standards for filing and maintaining charges; (3) the role of innocence in the charging
decision; (4) discretionary factors in the charging decision; (5) improper considerations
in the charging decision; (6) the role of race and community pressure; (7) the issue of
filing multiple charges-so-called "overcharging"-and (8) the Standard for actions
premised on a defendant's agreement not to sue.
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INTRODUCTION
A prosecutor's charging decision is the heart of the prosecution
function. Three features of the charging decision stand out. First, the
prosecutor's charging decision involves an enormous exercise of power-
described by Justice Robert H. Jackson as "the most dangerous power of
the prosecutor."' Second, that power is virtually unreviewable.' Third,
the charging decision is an exercise of discretion that involves so many
factors and considerations that it cannot be reduced to a simple formula.
It is therefore difficult to design professional standards to guide a
prosecutor's charging function except in the broadest terms.
I. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INsT. Cuma. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5
(1940).
2. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.) ("Few subjects
are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when
and whether to institute criminal proceedings .... ).
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The current ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9, described below,
attempts to address several key issues that inform the charging decision.
The proposed revisions to the Standards by the Task Force,' also
described below, change this approach by dividing the charging function
into two separate standards: Standard 3-5.5 and Standard 3-5.6.' The
proposed Standards amplify the current Standard by broadening the
language in several of the provisions and adding several new provisions.
Thus, proposed Standard 3-5.5 focuses on the appropriate standard a
prosecutor should apply in deciding whether to file and maintain criminal
charges.6 Proposed Standard 3-5.6 focuses on several of the discretionary
factors that a prosecutor should consider in making that decision, as well
as some of the recurring issues that influence the exercise of discretion.
It is unclear whether these charging Standards purport to establish
ethical guidelines for prosecution, or merely guidelines for a prosecutor's
exercise of judgment and policy in the charging function. If the Task
Force intended to establish ethical rules for the charging function, it
probably should have cross-referenced the charging Standards with
3. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993).
4. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (Proposed Revisions 2oo9).The
Task Force, composed of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and academics, recently completed a
draft of revised sets of Standards for consideration by the ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards
Committee. After completing its work, the Standards Committee will present its proposed revisions to
the Criminal Justice Section Council for consideration, debate, revisions, and approval. See generally
Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and
Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. IIII (201) (describing the process); Martin Marcus, The Making
of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at io
(same).
5. Id. H§ 3-5.5, 3-5.6. The Task Force's rationale in separating the current Standard into two
separate proposed Standards is unstated. Perhaps the Task Force believed that the separation would
promote clarity and consistency. To be sure, proposed Standard 3-3.5 focuses mostly on the
prosecutor's mental state in filing and maintaining charges, whereas proposed Standard 3-3.6 identifies
several discretionary factors in charging. Id. However, although the two proposed Standards broaden
the language in the current Standard in several respects, there are several provisions in the proposed
Standards that appear to overlap with each other and may even reduce the level of simplicity and
clarity in the current Standard.
6. Id. § 3-5-5. Although this Standard refers to the "methods by which a prosecutor may pursue
criminal charges, including complaints, informations, and grand jury indictments," the substance of the
Standard focuses not on a prosecutor's "methods" of charging but, rather, on the prosecutor's belief in
the factual basis for the charges, his belief in the defendant's guilt or innocence, and the avoidance of
improper considerations in charging. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.C-G.
7. Id. § 3-5.6. The Task Force also revised and renumbered current Standards 3-3.4, 3-3.5, 3-3.6,
and 3-3.8, which deal with the prosecutor's relations with investigators, complainants, and the grand
jury, and a prosecutor's consideration of noncriminal dispositions. Compare id. H§ 3-5-1, 3-5.2, 3-5.3, 3-
5.4 (providing the Task Force proposed revisions), with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION H 3-3.4, 3-3.5, 3-3.6, 3-3.8 (3d ed. 1993) (providing the current, unrevised
Standards). As noted below, current Standard 3-3.7, dealing with the "quality and scope of evidence
for information," has been renumbered as proposed Standard 3-5.5(a). See discussion infra Part II.B.
Given the limited space and time constraints, I have decided to focus exclusively on the revisions to
the principal charging standard: current Standard 3-3.9.
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proposed Standard 3-1.3, entitled "Improper Bias Prohibited."8 This
Standard provides in subdivision (a), "A prosecutor should not invidiously
discriminate against, or in favor of, any person on the basis of
constitutionally or statutorily impermissible criteria," and "should not
use other improper considerations (such as partisan or other improper
political or personal factors) in exercising prosecutorial discretion."'
With the exception of establishing the appropriate evidentiary standard
for charging, it would appear that as an ethical proscription, proposed
Standard 3-1.3 would adequately cover a prosecutor's charging conduct.
It might, therefore, seem unnecessary and superfluous to include in the
"charging Standards" a list of factors and considerations that rely on a
prosecutor's policy, expertise, and judgment.
To be sure, the Task Force has made significant changes to the
current Standards with respect to the proper factors and considerations
that affect a prosecutor's charging conduct. My comments are intended
to assess the extent to which the Task Force has addressed several
charging issues effectively, inadequately, or at all. My comments focus
specifically on (I) the retention and modification of the probable cause
standard for filing charges; (2) the differing standards for filing and
maintaining charges; (3) the role of innocence in the charging decision;
(4) discretionary factors in the charging decision; (5) improper
considerations in the charging decision; (6) the role of race and
community pressure; (7) the issue of filing multiple charges-so-called
"overcharging"-and (8) the Standard for actions premised on a
defendant's agreement not to sue.,o
I. ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS
Current Standard 3-3.9, entitled "Discretion in the Charging
Decision," is modified by two of the new proposed Standards, Standards
3-5.5 and 3-5.6 respectively. This Part describes the provisions set forth in
each of these Standards.
8. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-I.3 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
9. Id.
io. There is no Standard that addresses a prosecutor's decision to charge capital murder. The
only reference to the death penalty in the proposed Standards appears in Standard 3-6.6, relating to
the preservation of evidence in death penalty cases. Id. § 3-6.6. Unquestionably, a prosecutor plays a
central role in deciding whether to invoke capital punishment, and a large majority of states and the
federal government authorize capital punishment. Charging capital murder presents many discretionary
considerations for a prosecutor, involving specific aggravating and mitigating factors not usually
considered in charging noncapital crimes. Even though the ABA apparently takes no position on the
death penalty, it is surprising that the Prosecution Function Standards do not address the range of
issues relating to a prosecutor's charging conduct in death penalty cases.
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A. CURRENT STANDARD 3-3.9: DISCRETION IN THE CHARGING DECISION
Current Standard 3-3.9 conditions and circumscribes the
prosecutor's decision to institute charges against individuals. In particular,
a prosecutor is advised not to bring or maintain criminal charges when
she "knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.""
Likewise, where she "has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
accused," her supervisor ought not to compel her to bring or maintain
charges." The prosecutor also ought to have "sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction" when bringing or maintaining those
charges." In fact, she "should not bring or seek charges greater . .. than
can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary
to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense." 4
On the other hand, when deciding to bring charges, a prosecutor
may decide not to prosecute certain charges, even in the presence of
"sufficient evidence ... [to] support a conviction," where "circumstances
and .. . good cause consistent with the public interest" warrant such a
decision." The Standard lists a number of "illustrative" factors that the
prosecutor may consider deciding whether to bring or maintain charges,
including (i) reasonable doubt as to the accused's actual guilt; (2) "the
extent of the harm caused by the offense;" (3) the proportionality of the
potential punishment "to the particular offense or the offender;" (4) the
motives of the accuser; (5) the victim's willingness to testify; (6) the
degree to which the accused assists in prosecuting others; and (7) the
"availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction."' 6 In
addition to these factors, a prosecutor should not consider the personal
or political costs and benefits that might derive from the decision to bring
or maintain criminal charges." Moreover, where there is "a serious threat
to the community," she must not decline to press charges on the ground
that juries in the community tend "to acquit persons accused of the
particular kind of criminal act in question"'"8
Finally, the Standard addresses the decision to dismiss any charges,
entry of nolle prosequi, or "similar action": ending the case should not be
"condition[ed] . . . on the accused's relinquishment of the right to seek
civil redress unless the accused has agreed to the action knowingly and
I. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed.1993).
12. Id. § 3-3.9(c).
13. Id. § 3-3.9(a).
14. Id. § 3-3-9(0.
15. Id. § 3-3.9(b).
6. Id. § 3-3.9(b)(i)4vii).
17. Id. § 3-3.9(d).
I8. Id. § 3-3.9(e).
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intelligently, freely and voluntarily, and where such waiver is approved
by the court.""
B. PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5-5: THE DECISION TO FILE AND MAINTAIN
CRIMINAL CHARGES
By contrast, the proposed Standards divide the aspects of a
prosecutor's job into two different sections. The first, in proposed
Standard 3-5.5, is "The Decision to File and Maintain Criminal
Charges."o That Standard conditions the initial filing of charges on
whether "the prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable
cause and reasonably believes that there will be admissible evidence to
support the charges beyond reasonable doubt by the time of
disposition."" As in the current Standard, the prosecutor should not
consider the potential personal or political costs and benefits in deciding
whether to file and maintain charges. Additionally, with particular
respect to the decision to charge "[r]ace or other unlawful factors should
never be considered. .. ."2 However, irrespective of the weight of the
evidence in the case, "if the prosecutor believes the defendant is
innocent," she should neither file nor maintain charges."
Once the prosecutor files charges, those charges "should [be]
maintain[ed] only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that probable
cause continues to exist" and that there will be enough "admissible
evidence to support the charges beyond reasonable doubt by the time of
disposition."24 Dismissal of charges is therefore warranted when a
"prosecutor reasonably believes there is no probable cause to support
them."" Finally, "[a] prosecutor should not take criminal charges to final
judgment if the prosecutor reasonably believes that proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is lacking.",,6
C. PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5.6: DISCRETION IN FILING AND MAINTAINING
CRIMINAL CHARGES
The second aspect, in Standard 3-5.6, focuses on the exercise of
discretion in prosecuting a case. Entitled "Discretion in Filing and
Maintaining Criminal Charges," the Standard clarifies that a prosecutor
may exercise their discretion in deciding whether and what charges to
bring and maintain in light of the available evidence. In particular, the
19. Id. § 3-3-9(g)-
20. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
21. Id. § 3-5-5(a).
22. Id. § 3 -5-5(d).
23. Id. § 3-5.5(c).
24. Id. § 3 -5.5 (b).
25. Id. § 3-5.5(c).
26. Id.
1264 [Vol. 62.I 1259
THE CHARGING FUNCTION
prosecutor need not "file or maintain all criminal charges which the
evidence might support."" Indeed, she may decline to prosecute a case,
despite the state of the evidence, where circumstances and "good cause
consistent with the public interest" may warrant." Factors that a
prosecutor "may properly consider" when deciding to "decline or dismiss
charges" include the following: (i) any reasonable doubt as to the
accused's actual guilt; (2) "the extent of the harm caused by the offense;"
(3) the proportionality of the potential punishment "to the particular
offense or the offender;" (4) the motives of the accuser; (5) the victim's
willingness to testify; (6) any "improper conduct by law enforcement
actors in the matter;" (7) the degree to which prosecuting the case would
undermine "the policy that similarly situated persons be treated equally;"
(8) the "potential collateral impact[] on third-parties, including witnesses
or victims;" (9) the degree to which the accused assists in prosecuting
others; (lo) the particulars of the offender's character, or his situation;
(ii) "changes in the evidence, legal rules, disposition of similar cases, or
in the larger cultural context, including that the statute has fallen into
desuetude;" (12) the effect on the public welfare of the decision either to
prosecute or to decline to prosecute; (I3) "the fair and efficient
distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;" and (14) "the availability
and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction."" Another
important consideration is the Standard's directive that "[t]he prosecutor
should not file or maintain charges greater in number or degree than can
reasonably be supported with evidence at trial and that are necessary to
fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or deter similar conduct."3 o
However, if the evidence does support the charges, "[a] prosecutor may
file and maintain charges even if juries in the jurisdiction" typically
''acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in
question."
The Standard further advises prosecutors to express any doubts
about the evidence in their cases to their supervisors. If an "individual
prosecutor has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused," her
supervisor should not compel her to prosecute the case.32 But, the office
may still bring or maintain criminal charges "where there is reasonable
disagreement" about the evidence in the case and where the office
complies "with other applicable standards."3
27. Id. § 3-5.6(a).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(i)-(xiv).
30. Id. § 3-5.6(d).
31. Id. § 3-5.6(c).
32. Id § 3-5.6(b).
33. Id.
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Finally, with respect to dismissal, nolle prosequi, and other actions
ending a criminal case, "[a] prosecutor may condition" such an action
"on the accused's relinquishment of a right to seek civil redress, only if
the accused has agreed to the action knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily, and such waiver is disclosed to the court."' But, the
"decision not to file criminal charges should be made on its merits and
not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver."35 Such a waiver should
not be used "to avoid a bona fide claim of improper law enforcement." '
II. SOME COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
The provisions in the proposed Standards are markedly different
from the ones set forth in the current Standard. The remainder of this
Article parses through these differences, which, if adopted, could
significantly impact the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
A. RETENTION AND MODIFICATION OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
Proposed Standard 3-5.5 retains the "probable cause" standard for
instituting criminal charges37 but describes the prosecutor's mental state
differently than does the current Standard 3-3.9(a).'8 Under the proposed
Standard, "A prosecutor should file criminal charges only if the
prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause.""
Under the current Standard, "A prosecutor should not
institute . . . criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges
are not supported by probable cause."4 o Two points are noteworthy.
First, the proposed Standard uses different language to describe the
prosecutor's mental state-namely, "believes" instead of "knows."4
Interestingly, both the current Standard and the proposed Standard focus
exclusively on the prosecutor's subjective state of mind; neither Standard
requires that the prosecutor's belief be objectively reasonable.42 To be
34. Id. § 3-5.6(e).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 3-5-5.
38. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993). As noted,
the prefatory language in proposed Standard 3-5.5 states that the Standard addresses "the methods by
which a prosecutor may pursue criminal charges, including complaints, informations, and grand jury
indictments." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions
2009). However, as also noted, the text of the current Standard appears to say nothing about these
"methods" of charging, focusing instead on the prosecutor's mental state in filing and maintaining
charges. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).
39. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009)
(emphasis added).
40. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis
added).
41. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
42. It is noteworthy that the Standards do not define the terms used to describe the prosecutor's
1266 [Vol. 62:I259
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sure, as an evidentiary standard, it does seem much more appropriate to
refer to what a prosecutor "believes" rather than what a prosecutor
"knows." Indeed, we typically refer to a police officer's belief in probable
cause, rather than to his "knowing" of the existence of probable cause.
And under the familiar definition of probable cause- "reasonable
ground for belief of guilt"43 -one would therefore understand this
Standard to require a prosecutor "to believe that there are reasonable
grounds to believe," which is a peculiar mindset but is, nonetheless, the
basis required by this Standard.
Second, both the current Standard and the proposed Standard
require a prosecutor to have a subjective belief that there exists at least
some quantum of proof in terms of the scope and quality of evidence
amounting to "probable cause" before filing charges-in other words,
that it is more likely than not that a crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it. As the commentary to the current Standard
acknowledges, a probable cause standard is an extremely low threshold
for bringing charges." Indeed, unless there is some basis for believing
that a prosecutor filed charges in bad faith for the purpose of
harassment, retaliation, or discrimination, it would seem to be virtually
impossible to demonstrate that, when she brought charges, a prosecutor
lacked a subjective belief that they were supported by probable cause. As
either an ethical or a practice-oriented rule, this Standard seems to
require so little of a prosecutor that short of venality, it would appear to
allow reckless and incompetent charging without any risk of professional
oversight.45
This is not to say that applying a probable cause standard in practice
does not raise useful questions which both the current and the proposed
Standards fail to address specifically. For example, there is no indication
that either the current or proposed Standards require a prosecutor to
conduct any investigation or to consider the quality and quantity of
evidence before determining that probable cause exists. As a matter of
professional ethics, should not a prosecutor investigate the credibility of
the complainant and witnesses before bringing charges? Should not a
mental state, including terms such as "knows," "believes," and "reasonably believes." Presumably, the
Standards rely on Rule i.o of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled "Terminology," for
definitions of these terms. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.o (2010).
43. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. i6o, 175-76 (1949).
44. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993)
("[P]robable cause standard, which is substantially less than sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a
conviction, is sufficiently minimal that a prosecutor should not err in deciding whether the quantum of
evidence is adequate to institute criminal proceedings.").
45. Notably, the Model Rules also use the probable cause standard for criminal charges. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (200) ("Special Responsibility of a Prosecutor"). However,
the Model Rules treat a prosecutor's conduct in a much more limited fashion than do the far more
specific and comprehensive ABA Criminal Justice Standards.
May 20II] 1267
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
prosecutor consider contradictory evidence that negates guilt? Consider
the following case:
A complainant alleges she was sexually attacked by three students
after she was hired to engage in an exotic dance performance at a
college party. She identifies from a police photo lineup the three
individuals who allegedly attacked her. Medical procedures detect
vaginal swelling, and a professional opines that her behavior is
consistent with that of a victim of a sex crime.46
Under the current Standard, a prosecutor could believe that there is
probable cause that a rape occurred and that the three persons identified
by the complainant committed this crime. However, should a prosecutor,
as a matter of professional ethics and sound prosecutorial practice, be
required to conduct an investigation to determine the accuracy of the
allegation? Moreover, should a prosecutor be required to consider
contradictory evidence in evaluating whether probable cause exists? For
example, assume that the prosecutor in the above case receives reliable
evidence that the complainant was intoxicated during the party, that she
initially misidentified one of the perpetrators as not being involved, that
she initially recanted her claim that she had been raped, that she had a
history of mental illness, that no DNA from the rape kit matched any of
the three alleged perpetrators but did match several other males, and
that a friend of the complainant who was with her at the party described
her rape allegation as a fabrication.
As an ethical matter, as well as a matter of policy and judgment, the
proposed Standard authorizes a prosecutor to file criminal charges "only
if the prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause."47
Are they? The complainant has identified three perpetrators as having
raped her, and there is some corroboration. Should a prosecutor, in
forming a belief in the existence of probable cause, consider the
substantial evidence that appears to contradict guilt? The proposed
Standard does not answer this question. It would seem that if the
Standard requires that the prosecutor's belief be reasonable, then a
prosecutor would likely have to consider this contradictory evidence.
Obviously many prosecutors, as a matter of policy and judgment,
probably would consider evidence negating probable cause before
bringing charges. However, a Standard that presumes to serve as a
guideline for professionally proper prosecutorial conduct should
46. I have used as the basis for this hypothetical the highly publicized and controversial Duke
lacrosse rape case. For a comprehensive account of the case, see STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON,
UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE
LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2oo7). For a discussion of the prosecutor and the media in the case, see Andrew
E. Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More
Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1294-98 (2011).
47. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2oo9).
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explicitly require a prosecutor to consider the credibility of witnesses and
the existence of contradictory evidence before instituting charges.
Aside from considering the scope and quality of the proof in
"believing" that probable cause exists, does a prosecutor's determination
of probable cause include an interpretation of a broadly worded criminal
statute that may or may not cover certain conduct? In other words, does
probable cause include a legal determination, or merely a factual one?
Consider the following case:
Assume that a federal prosecutor is deciding whether to bring charges
against Defendant for "introducing into interstate commerce a
misbranded food with intent to defraud or mislead.""5 The facts show
that Defendant bought two million bottles of salad dressing from a
manufacturer and planned to resell the bottles to consumers through
discount outlets such as "dollar stores." The label on each bottle
originally contained a notation "best when purchased by," followed by
a date. Before reselling the bottles, the defendant pasted a new label
on the bottle over the part containing the "best when purchased by"
date by adding a new date marked six months later. The prosecutor, in
deciding to charge Defendant with fraud, has characterized the change
as the date when "the dressing would expire." Although the statute
defines misbranded food, there is nothing about dates on labels. No
regulation of the Food and Drug Administration defines "best when
purchased by" or forbids a wholesaler or retailer to change the date.49
Is there a basis for the prosecutor to believe that there is probable
cause that the defendant violated the above statute? Assume there is no
evidence, as the prosecutor should realize, that selling the salad dressing
after the "best when purchased by" date endangers health or affects the
taste, or that any consumer has complained. Moreover, the prosecutor, in
filing the charge, needs to assume that changing the dates on labels
constitutes "misbranding" and is conduct intended to "defraud and
mislead." To be sure, among the discretionary factors that would affect
the prosecutor's decision to charge are the harm caused by the offense,
the impact of prosecution on the public welfare, and whether the
prosecutor has a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Given the
fact that charging abuses can occur from a prosecutor's overly broad
interpretation of an ambiguous statute,o it might be appropriate for the
proposed Standards to clarify that the probable cause standard applies
not only to a prosecutor's belief in the evidentiary basis for the charge,
48. United States v. Farinella, 558 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a),
333(a)(2) (2006)).
49. This example is adapted from United States v. Farinella, 558 F-3d 695.
50. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the
so-called "honest services" statute, covers only bribery and kickback schemes and does not authorize
prosecutors to charge public or private officials with undisclosed self-dealing).
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but also to a prosecutor's belief that the statute reasonably covers the
charged offense."
B. DIFFERING STANDARDS FOR INITIAL CHARGE, RETENTION OF CHARGE,
AND DISPOSITION
Under current Standard 3-3.9(a), a prosecutor is forbidden, after
instituting criminal charges, to "permit the continued pendency" of those
charges "when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported
by probable cause," and "in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence
to support a conviction."" Under proposed Standard 3-5.5(a), as noted
above, a prosecutor is authorized to file criminal charges "only if the
prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause and
reasonably believes that there will be admissible evidence to support the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt by the time of disposition.""
Moreover, under proposed Standard 3-5.5(b), the prosecutor is
authorized to "maintain criminal charges only if the prosecutor
reasonably believes that probable cause continues to exist and that the
prosecution has or will obtain admissible evidence to support the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt by the time of disposition."' As in the
current Standard, the proposed Standard continues to draw a distinction
with respect to the prosecutor's state of mind between filing criminal
charges and maintaining those charges, namely, that a prosecutor may
file charges only if he actually believes that probable cause exists, but
may maintain the charges only if there is an objective, reasonable basis
for him to believe that probable cause continues to exist.
Imposing one standard for a prosecutor's mental state in the initial
filing of charges and another for the continued retention of charges raises
several questions. First, it would appear to be illogical to authorize a
prosecutor to file a charge if the prosecutor subjectively believes there is
probable cause, but to forbid a prosecutor to maintain the charge when
he lacks a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.
Moreover, as a matter of professional ethics, there should be no
distinction in terms of the prosecutor's belief in the existence of probable
cause when deciding to file the charge and when deciding to maintain the
charge. There does not appear to be any good reason why the standard
for charging should be more forgiving and less rigorous than the standard
for maintaining the charge. In fact, there may be cogent reasons for
51. The same might be said of a potential charge that may be time-barred or a charge based on
evidence that may be subject to exclusion for unlawful police conduct.
52. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis
added).
53. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(a) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
54. Id- § 3-5-5(b).
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imposing an even more rigorous standard for the initial charging decision
than for the decision to continue the charge.
Unquestionably, the mere filing of a charge can have devastating
consequences on a person's life, liberty, and reputation. As noted above,
the subjective probable cause standard is so minimal that it offers very
little protection from careless and reckless charging, to say nothing of a
prosecutor's deliberate and bad faith charging. Indeed, in the rape case
above, the damage to the defendants' lives from the prosecutor's charge
was enormous." Moreover, there are sound reasons for a prosecutor to
be more careful in making the initial charging decision than in the
charge-retention decision. As in the rape hypothetical, there were many
cues that should have alerted the prosecutor to the deficiencies of the
complainant's story and the reliability of her identifications. Before any
charges are formally instituted, a prosecutor has much greater latitude to
investigate the case and to scrutinize the credibility of evidence, as well
as the motives of victims and witnesses. Once formal charges are
brought, however, and the die is cast, so to speak, it may be much more
difficult for a prosecutor to scrutinize the evidence as she would have
done earlier. Indeed, once charges are brought, a prosecutor's mindset
may take on a tunnel-vision quality, focusing only on the evidence of
guilt and disregarding evidence that is inconsistent with guilt. Equally
important, once the victim knows that a charge has been filed based on
her complaint, it may be much more difficult for the victim to recant or
acknowledge a mistake. This may especially be the case when the victim
has made an earlier identification." The ability of a prosecutor to
scrutinize the accuracy of that identification would seem to be greater
before a charge is filed than after. Further, once charges are filed, and
the case is in the public arena, there are many systemic protections
available for an accused to correct a mistaken charge, which are
unavailable prior to charges being filed." Finally, the prosecutor is always
protected from a false or mistaken charge by the availability of plea
deals, even in cases where the prosecutor does not reasonably believe
that probable cause exists."
55. Taslitz, supra note 46, at 1294-96.
56. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) ("Moreover, [ilt is a matter of common
experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on
his word later on...." (alteration in original) (quoting Glanville Williams & H.A. Hammelmann,
Identification Parades-I, 1963 Cium. L. REv. 479,482) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. Such procedural protections include a motion to dismiss the indictment or information, a
motion to suppress evidence relating to the charge, and, of course, the right to a trial, either before a
judge or a jury.
58. See People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a prosecutor's failure to
disclose during plea negotiations that complaining witness had died does not invalidate plea); see also
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (holding that a prosecutor was not required to disclose
during plea negotiations evidence that could undermine the credibility of government witnesses).
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C. CHARGING AND INNOCENCE
Given the increasing concern by courts, commentators, and the
public over the prosecution and conviction of innocent persons, the
proposed Standards have addressed explicitly in Standard 3-5.5(c) the
prosecutor's filing and maintaining criminal charges against potentially
innocent persons.S9 Once again, as in proposed Standards 3-5.5(a) and
(b), Standard 3-5.5(c) makes a distinction between a prosecutor's
subjective and objective mental states." Thus, according to this Standard,
"A prosecutor should not file or maintain charges if the prosecutor
believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the
evidence." 6' The proposition that a prosecutor should not charge
someone with a crime whom he believes is innocent may seem so obvious
as not to require a special ethical rule." Nevertheless, such a Standard
might be relevant, as in the rape case above, where a prosecutor has
legally sufficient evidence to charge and convict, and where it is
conceivable that a jury might convict based on that proof, but the
prosecutor does not believe the truth of that evidence. This Standard
would authorize the prosecutor to dismiss the charge, even though
sufficient evidence of guilt exists to persuade a jury to convict.63
The proposed Standard also appears to address more directly an
ethical question that has attracted some attention, which was considered
in the current Standard but not resolved.64 Consider a case in which a
prosecutor has filed charges based on probable cause. While the case is
pending, the evidence of guilt disappears-as for example, when the
government's key witness dies-but the defense is unaware of this
occurrence. Under these circumstances, according to proposed Standard
3-5.5(c), "the prosecutor reasonably believes that proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is lacking" and under this Standard, "should not take
criminal charges to final judgment."' Obviously, a prosecutor would not




62. Proposed Standard 3-5.6(a)(i), as in current Standard 3-3.9(b)(i), states that one of the
discretionary factors that a prosecutor may consider in charging is "the prosecutor's reasonable doubt
that the accused is in fact guilty." Id. § 3-5.6(a)(i); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 -3 .9 (b)(i) (3d ed. 1993). A reasonable doubt, needless to say, is different
from actually believing a defendant is innocent.
63. Whether it is ethical for a prosecutor to ask a jury to convict when the prosecutor himself
harbors a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt is a question that the Standards do not address.
64. See People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 42 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the prosecutor was not
required to disclose to defense during plea negotiations that a key witness had died). The commentary
to current Standard 3-3.9 states, "This Standard takes no position on this question." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993).
65. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(c) (Proposed Revisions
2009). The term "final judgment" typically includes not only a conviction after trial but a conviction by
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bring such a case to trial; he lacks sufficient evidence to convict. But
assuming the defense requested that the prosecutor accept a plea, would
the prosecutor ethically be allowed to enter into such a deal when the
deal would lead to a "final judgment" through a guilty plea-even
though the prosecutor "reasonably believes that proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is lacking"? The proposed Standard appears to
preclude a prosecutor from accepting a plea offer leading to a final
judgment. But, if a defendant initiates a plea deal and voluntarily admits
his guilt, why should the prosecutor be precluded from accepting the
plea?
Moreover, as noted above, the proposed Standards are silent as to
whether a prosecutor should be required, as a matter of professional
ethics, to investigate the case before charging and to consider
contradictory and exculpatory evidence in deciding whether to charge. It
would seem that the special interest in the proposed Standards in a
defendant's innocence would be well-served by explicitly noting, either in
the Standard relating to probable cause for charging or even as
"illustrative factors" relevant to a prosecutor's discretionary decision to
decline or dismiss charges," the requirement that a prosecutor investigate
the case before charging, as well as a requirement that a prosecutor
consider contradictory and exculpatory evidence.
Also relevant to the question of innocence is a new provision in the
proposed Standard 3-5.6(b) requiring an individual prosecutor to disclose
to his supervisor any significant doubts about the quality or sufficiency of
the evidence in a case "assigned to the prosecutor."' The current
Standard, 3-3-9(c), merely states that a "prosecutor should not be
compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which he or she
has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused."6 The proposed
Standard restates this principle, but goes on to state that the office may
continue prosecution anyway.6 In doing so, the proposed Standard
leaves several questions unresolved. Even though an assistant prosecutor
may not be compelled to prosecute a case in which he has significant
doubts about the defendant's guilt, is it permissible for his supervisor to
take punitive action against that prosecutor? The Standard does not
answer this question. Moreover, what if an individual prosecutor has
significant doubts about a case not "assigned to the prosecutor"? There
a guilty plea as well. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("A plea of guilty is more than a
confession which admits that the accused did the various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains
but to give judgment and determine punishment.").
66. See discussion infra Part IID.
67. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 -5 .6(b) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
68. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(c) (3d ed. 1993).




is no requirement in the Standard that he disclose these doubts to his
supervisor, even though nondisclosure may result in a wrongful
prosecution against a potentially innocent defendant. It would seem that
if a prosecutor reasonably believes that a wrongful prosecution is being
pursued by any prosecutor in his office, he has a duty to alert his
supervisor.
D. DISCRETIONARY FACTORS IN CHARGING
The current Standard 3-3.9 enumerates as "illustrative" several
factors that may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising the
charging function.'o Proposed Standard 3-5.6 adds several other factors to
the list." First, the prefatory language in the current Standard states that
these factors may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising
his discretion to bring charges." The proposed Standard states that these
factors may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising his
discretion "to decline or dismiss charges."7 3 It is unclear why the proposed
Standard enumerates these factors as reasons to "decline or dismiss"
charges rather than as factors used to decide whether to file charges in
the first place. Moreover, the inclusion in the list of several new factors,
as noted below, appears to reflect factors that prosecutors routinely
consider in deciding whether to charge. However, neither the current nor
the proposed Standards attempt to establish any priority or hierarchy
with respect to these factors, presumably suggesting that these factors are
of equal importance.
The factors identified in the current Standard-all of which are
retained in the proposed Standard-are discussed at length in the
commentary to the current Standard.74 These factors are familiar and
unexceptional. Thus, a prosecutor should consider whether he believes
the accused is guilty, the extent of the harm caused by the offense,
whether the punishment is excessive, any improper motives of the
complainant, any reluctance of victim to testify, any cooperation of the
accused in the apprehension of others, and the likelihood of prosecution
in another jurisdiction."
The proposed Standard adds six new factors" to the list, which may
best be examined by considering the following case:
70. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b)(i)-(vii) (3d ed. 1993).
71. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(a)(i)-(xiv) (Proposed
Revisions 2009).
72. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (3d ed. 1993).
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(a) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993).
75. Id. § 3-3.9.




Joe and Tom are having sex on a picnic table in a public park around 5
p.m. Joe, thirty-five years old, is married with two young children and
works for a computer company. Tom, nineteen years old, is a college
student. The couple is spotted by two thirteen-year-old boys who tell
their mothers. They called the police who arrive at the scene and arrest
Joe and Tom. The prosecutor decides to charge Joe with adultery and
Tom with public lewdness. The prosecutor, an elected official, has a
reputation as a strong social conservative who has made public
comments decrying homosexuality, abortion, and teenage sex. The
prosecutor believes there is probable cause for the charges, has no
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, reasonably believes that
given the testimony of witnesses he will have sufficient admissible
evidence to convict, and believes that the public conduct in question is
extremely harmful to the morals and quality of life in his community."
Several of the newly-added factors listed in the proposed Standards raise
questions about whether it is proper to charge adultery in the above case.
Consider the application of the following discretionary factors in the
proposed Standards:
i. The prosecutor is aware of the existence of extramarital affairs in
his community between married men and women. No charge of
adultery has ever been brought in such cases, even though guilt
could be proved. Does the prosecution of Joe for adultery
"undercut the policy that similarly situated persons be treated
equally"?T
2. Given that Joe has a wife and children and that the two young
boys who witnessed the sexual conduct will be made to testify if
the case goes to trial, will the prosecution of Joe have adverse
"potential collateral impacts on third-parties"?"
3. Given that Joe has an apparently intact family, with two young
children, a steady job, and no criminal record, are Joe's
"character" and "situation" relevant mitigating considerations?,
4. Assuming that there have been only a few prosecutions for
adultery in this jurisdiction in the past fifty years, have there also
been sufficient "changes in the larger cultural context" in this
community and has the statute "fallen into desuetude," making a
charge of adultery inappropriate?'
5. What impact will such prosecution have on the "public
welfare"?8
6. Does this prosecution reflect a "fair and efficient distribution of
limited prosecutorial resources"?"'
77. This example is adapted from Eamon McNiff, Woman Charged with Adultery to Challenge
New York Law, ABC NEWS (June 8, 20o0), http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=10857437.
78. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCrION § 3-5.6(a)(vii) (Proposed Revisions
2oo9).
79. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(viii).
8o. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(x).
81. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(xi).
82. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(xii).
83. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(xiii).
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This case reflects the difficulty of imposing meaningful professional
standards on a prosecutor's charging discretion. To be sure, factors such
as these are clearly relevant to a prosecutor's careful and responsible
charging decision; that's what discretion is all about. But these factors are
so malleable and subjective that they arguably would lead some
prosecutors not to bring charges of adultery, while at the same time
justifying the decision to bring the very same charge. What complicates
the issue is the fact that this prosecutor holds strong views against
homosexuals and promiscuous sex, which the citizens who elected him
may well endorse, and his charging decision therefore may be
undertaken to further on his own personal and political ambitions. In
short, the enumeration of additional discretionary factors makes the list
more complete, but not necessarily more meaningful.
E. PERSONAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND UNLAWFUL FACTORS
IN CHARGING
Current Standard 3-3.9(d) and the proposed Standard 3-5.5(d) state
essentially the same principle in slightly different language: a prosecutor,
in bringing or maintaining criminal charges, should not consider personal
or political advantages or disadvantages, or the possibility of enhancing
his record of convictions.4 The proposed Standard adds new language
that does not appear in the current Standard: "Race or other unlawful
factors should never be considered in a decision to charge."' Consider
the following case:
Defendant, a state procurement official, is charged with fraudulent
misapplication of funds by allegedly steering a large contract to a travel
agency whose principal had donated heavily to the governor's
reelection campaign. The prosecutor, currently involved in a tough
reelection campaign himself, promotes, through a barrage of attack
ads, the claim that the charge against the procurement official is
evidence of corruption in the state government, which is controlled by
the opposite political party. During his tenure, the prosecutor has
brought several other corruption cases against government officials of
the opposite political party. He has never brought charges against
officials of his own party. There is evidence that the travel agency
submitted the lowest bid, and there is no evidence of a kickback or any
other impropriety in the acceptance of the bid. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the defendant knew or cared about the travel agency's
contribution to the governor. As one witness recalls, the defendant had
stated that the winning bidder should be selected for "political
reasons," but this witness had understood the defendant's remark to be
referring to the state's interest in fiscal responsibility and the fact that
84. Compare STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(d) (3d ed. 1993),
with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 -5 .5 (d) (Proposed Revisions 2009).




the travel agency was from the same state. The prosecutor is
reelected.g
In examining the charging standards, does this case implicate any of
the expressed concerns over charging for personal or political reasons?
Did the prosecutor actually believe there was probable cause for the
charge? Given the defendant's statement about "politics" and the
intimation of a close connection between the travel agency and the
governor, it would be virtually impossible to show that the prosecutor did
not believe that there was probable cause to charge. However, did the
prosecutor "consider [his] personal or political advantages" in bringing
the charge?8' Although according to this Standard, "unlawful factors
should never be considered in a decision to charge,"8 did the prosecutor
consider such factors in deciding to charge, namely, did he target this
defendant for prosecution because of her membership in a particular
political party? It might be useful to cross-reference this Standard with
proposed Standard 3-1-3, noted above, which prohibits prosecutors from
engaging in purposeful discrimination or basing conduct on legally-
protected activities.8
Perhaps the most that professional standards can do is to articulate
aspirational goals that probably can never be attained completely.'
There is no question that politics and personal advantage often enter into
prosecutorial decisionmaking, and it is better at least to set a high
standard. This is likely a place where a prosecutor's own personal
integrity and good judgment will determine his official conduct, and
general standards can provide very little guidance or deterrence.
F. RACE AND COMMUNITY PRESSURE
Current Standard 3-3.9 does not mention the impact of race or
community pressure on a prosecutor's charging decision. Current
Standard 3-3.9(e) and the proposed Standard 3-5.6(c) refer to the
influence of community pressure on a prosecutor by stating that a
prosecutor should not be deterred from instituting charges because juries
in the jurisdiction have tended to acquit defendants for the particular
86. This hypothetical was taken from United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 883-84 (7th Cir.
2oo7) (dismissing a charge after finding that there was no evidence of fraud).
87. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(d) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 3-1.3; see also supra pp. 1261-62. For cases holding that membership in a political party is
a constitutionally protected activity, see Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 64-65
(199o), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517, 520 (1980), and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350, 357
(1976).
9o. Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or
Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1175 (2011).
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crime involved." This latter principle would have relevance in a
community that typically acquits law enforcement officials accused of
using excessive force or that acquits defendants in domestic abuse
prosecutions. The proposed Standard does not refer directly to the
influence of community pressure on the charging decision but does state
that "[r]ace or other unlawful factors should never be considered in the
decision to charge."92 Consider the following case:
Owner of a Korean grocery store in largely black neighborhood has
been burglarized three times within the past six months. Other Korean
merchants have been victimized as well, and they believe, with some
justification, that their complaints to the police have not been
aggressively investigated. Owner decides during a particular week to
hide in the back of his store after closing time. One of these nights,
when an intruder forces open the rear door, Owner, without warning,
shoots and kills the intruder, who is a sixteen-year-old black youth with
a record of burglaries and assaults. The jurisdiction's penal code
provides that the use of deadly force is not justified unless the actor
reasonably believes that the other person is attempting to dispossess
him of his dwelling or is attempting to commit arson, burglary,
robbery, or felonious theft of property, and the use of nondeadly force
would expose the actor to the risk of serious bodily harm. Assume
there is no evidence that the store is Owner's dwelling or that the use
of nondeadly force would expose him to a risk of serious bodily harm.
The prosecutor has the option of charging murder, some degree of
manslaughter, or not charging any crime based on the view that Owner
was justified in killing the intruder.
This case suggests that prosecutors may be influenced, and
legitimately, by considerations of race and community pressure in filing
charges. The provision in the proposed Standard 3-5.5(d) that
"[r]ace ... should never be considered in a decision to charge" is too
broad. According to the hypothetical problem, the racial tensions in the
community, and the perceived failure of law enforcement to adequately
protect Korean business owners, motivated Owner to choose self-help
and culminated in this killing. The prosecutor almost certainly will
consider the racial tensions in the community and how race factors into
the killing when making the charging decision, although perhaps only as
a mitigating factor rather than as an exonerating factor. It would be
difficult in hindsight to criticize as illegitimate the prosecutor's
consideration of how race affects the prosecution of this case. The
prosecutor knows he could secure an indictment for murder, and that the
91. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(c) (Proposed Revisions
2009); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993). The Standard
does not address the reverse situation-in other words, a case in which a prosecutor decides not to file
charges because of his belief that juries would acquit. That seems to raise a more difficult ethical issue
and probably should be addressed in the Standards.
92. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(d) (Proposed Revisions
2oo9).
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justification defense likely would not be successful. The prosecutor also
reasonably expects that a mostly black jury with few or no Korean
members would likely convict Owner of murder, whereas a jury of
Asians would probably acquit. Once again, this is not a case for formal
professional guidelines; it is a case for policy, judgment, and a prosecutor's
personal ethics and integrity.
G. OVERCHARGING
The practice by some prosecutors of "overcharging" has been
criticized as an abuse of the charging function. However, it is not
completely clear what "overcharging" means, or why the practice is
illegitimate.' Proposed Standard 3-5.6(d) is similar to the current
Standard and states that a "prosecutor should not file ... charges greater
in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at
trial and that are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or
deter similar conduct."' Thus, a prosecutor may properly file charges
when reasonably based on the evidence and when the prosecutor
believes that such charges are necessary to reflect fairly the seriousness
of the conduct and to deter similar conduct. The Standard does not bar a
prosecutor from filing such charges, even if the prosecutor believes that
such charging provides additional leverage for the prosecutor in plea
bargaining. Consider the following case:
Defendant, driving home from work at 6 p.m., passes through a stop
sign without stopping and strikes a nine-year-old girl and her mother
while they are crossing the street. The girl is killed instantly and her
mother is critically injured. The defendant had been drinking, was
driving with a suspended license, and tread marks suggest that his
speed at the time of impact exceeded the posted speed limit of thirty
miles-per-hour by at least ten-to-fifteen miles-per-hour. There are
several homicide charges available, including criminally negligent
homicide, manslaughter, and murder. The prosecutor is considering
whether to include the highest count of murder in deciding to file
charges based on the theory that the defendant's conduct evinced a
culpable mental state that was recklessly indifferent to human life.
Would a charge of murder be an "overcharge"? Does the evidence
"reasonably support" a charge of murder? Does the prosecutor believe
that bringing a murder charge "fairly reflects" the seriousness of the
offense and may deter future motorists from such conduct?
The prosecutor's exercise of discretion must take into account a
range of factors that are enumerated in proposed Standard 3-5.6(a),
93. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993)
("Discretion in Selecting the Number and Degree of Charges").




which a prosecutor may consider in "declining or dismissing" charges.'
Current Standard 3-3.9(b) includes many of the same factors that a
prosecutor "may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion."
Examining the relevant factors listed in the Standards once again
demonstrates the difficulty of trying to formulate meaningful guidelines
that could be successfully applied in individual cases, particularly in those
cases where it must be determined whether a prosecutor has engaged in
illegitimate charging by filing more or higher charges than necessary.
Consider the following questions:
i. Does the prosecutor have a "reasonable doubt that the accused is
in fact guilty"?'
2. What is "the extent of the harm caused by the offense"?98
3. Is there a disproportion in the authorized punishment in relation
to the offense and the offender?"
4. Does the prosecutor have a "policy" regarding vehicular
homicides, and would charging murder undercut the policy "that
similarly situated persons be treated equally"?'"
5. What is the relevance to the exercise of the prosecutor's
discretion of "the character of the offender or other aspects of
the offender's situation"?o'
Is a murder charge an example of "overcharging"? Arguably, all of
the above factors are so broadly worded that they could be used by
different prosecutors both to support and to reject a murder charge. A
prosecutor could claim that there is no reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty of depraved-mind murder; that the harm is very grave; that the
punishment fits the crime; and that there is no general policy that would
be undercut by a murder charge. However, the "character of the
offender"-a nebulous and uncertain factor-may be the most critical
factor of all. Would the prosecutor be more likely to charge murder if the
defendant were an illegal immigrant than if the defendant were a judge
or a highly decorated veteran of the Iraq war? Does the defendant's
youth, family, or status matter? Once again, the list of factors relevant to
the exercise of discretion in making the charging decision does not
appear to raise ethical questions as much as it raises questions of
practice, policy, and judgment. However, given the opportunity for
widely different treatment of persons who have committed the same
crime, should such conduct raise ethical questions? If so, then the
95. Id. § 3-5.6(a).
96. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 - 3 .9 (b) ( 3 d ed. 1993).
97. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(a)(i) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
98. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(ii).
99. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(iii).
ioo. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(vii).
io. Id. § 3-5.6(a)(x).
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Standard is inadequate. Perhaps it would be better for the Standard to
state that even if the charges are reasonably supported by the evidence,
the prosecutor should not bring them when it reasonably appears that
they are being brought to gain a tactical advantage, either to induce a
plea, or to coerce a witness into cooperating with the government.
H. RELEASE-DISMISSAL CASES
Both the current Standard 3-3.9(g) and the proposed Standard 3-
5.6(e) address the question of whether and under what circumstances it is
proper for a prosecutor to condition the dismissal of criminal charges on
the defendant's promise to relinquish his right to bring a civil action
against the arresting police officers or other government officials for
violating his civil rights.o2 There is obviously an element of coercion in
requiring as a condition of dismissal a promise not to sue, and it may
reasonably be claimed that such a promise contravenes public policy.
However, the Supreme Court has upheld such agreements and held them
not to be per se void as against public policy." The current Standard and
the proposed Standard both attempt to clarify the question of when a
prosecutor may dismiss a charge if the defendant promises to release the
government from civil liability. The first sentence of the proposed
Standard essentially reiterates the current Standard but changes the
language to state that "a prosecutor may condition a dismissal ... only if
the accused has agreed [not to sue],"" whereas the current Standard
states that a prosecutor "should not condition a dismissal ... unless the
accused has agreed [not to sue]."" However, the added sentence in the
proposed Standard-"[a] prosecutor should not use a civil waiver to
avoid a bone [sic] fide claim of improper law enforcement"'s - appears
to contradict the first sentence or at least to confuse the matter. Consider
the following case:
Defendant has been arrested by a Transit Authority Officer for
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for engaging in loud and
profane conduct on a subway platform and for resisting arrest when the
Officer approached him and tried to get him to desist. Defendant
appears at his arraignment with a large welt under his eye, and in
response to the judge's question, the Officer states that the injury
occurred when Defendant fell and hit his face on a subway bench.
Defendant's lawyer advises the arraignment prosecutor that the Officer
102. See id. § 3-5.6(e); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(g) ( 3 d ed.
1993).
103. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,392 (1987).
104. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(e) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
105. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993).




and his partner had beaten Defendant at the booking location, and
when the skeptical prosecutor confronts the Officer, the latter
responds: "It happened the way I said it did, counsel." Assume
Defendant, through his lawyer, seeks a dismissal of charges contingent
upon Defendant's agreement not to bring a civil action against the
officers or the city.
Assume the prosecutor believes that Defendant has a "bona fide
claim of improper law enforcement." What should an ethical prosecutor
do? Does the Standard tell us? On the one hand, under both the current
Standard 3-3.9(g) and the proposed Standard 3-5.6(e), "the accused has
agreed to the action knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and such
waiver is disclosed to the court."'" The prosecutor, therefore, may accept
the waiver. On the other hand, new language in Standard 3-5.6(e) states
that the prosecutor "should not use a civil waiver to avoid a bone [sic]
fide claim of improper law enforcement," and that the decision not to file
criminal charges against the defendant "should be made on the merits
and not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver.""8 The prosecutor
faces a dilemma produced by a confusing Standard. The prosecutor could
decide that there is no merit to the criminal charges, and that, therefore,
he would be justified in accepting the waiver. But if the prosecutor is
either uncertain about the validity of the criminal charges or is skeptical
of the officer's story, is the prosecutor's decision to accept a waiver and
dismiss the charges made legitimately "on its merits," or is it made
illegitimately "for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver"? Under the
proposed Standard, we cannot know.
It seems that the intent of the proposed Standard is to allow a
defendant to initiate a dismissal of charges by agreeing not to sue if the
charges are dismissed. The prosecutor could then decide to agree to the
defendant's request if he believes the dismissal and waiver are in the
public interest. The Standard appears to be intended to bar the
prosecutor from initiating such a discussion because of its inherently
coercive nature. If that is the Standard's intent, it should state that
position explicitly. As presently written, the proposed Standard is
unclear.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Standards dealing with the prosecutor's charging
function and the exercise of charging discretion have made several
additions to the current Standards. To bring charges, a prosecutor must
"believe" rather than "know" that the charges are supported by probable
cause and must have a "reasonable belief" in their continued validity to
lo7. Id.; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION§ 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993).
io8. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.6(e) (Proposed Revisions
2oo9).
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retain those charges for disposition. The proposed Standards, for the first
time, acknowledge the impact on the charging function of potential
innocence and the responsibility of a prosecutor when he believes that he
may be prosecuting an innocent person. The proposed Standards also
add several new factors to the list of factors relevant to a prosecutor's
exercise of discretion.
However, as I have tried to demonstrate with my hypothetical cases,
the charging function is so complex, and the discretionary process so fact
specific, that it easily eludes standardized decisionmaking. Requiring a
prosecutor to believe that a charge is based on probable cause will
support almost any charging decision; listing without any attempt at
prioritization numerous discretionary factors will support virtually any
charging decision not shown to have been made in bad faith, no matter
how egregious it appears. To be sure, the proposed Standards, as well as
the current Standards, are a perfectly legitimate attempt to establish
aspirational rules. Insofar as they may purport to provide meaningful
guidelines for prosecutors engaged in making charging decisions, the
Standards do not appear to be relevant or helpful.
